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DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
None. {See Brief of Appellant, hereafter "Br. of Aplnt.," at 1.) 
ARGUMENT 
The parties are in basic agreement on the facts, issues, standard of review, and 
standards for interpretation of restrictive covenants. The points of dispute are legal 
questions: whether the covenants permit construction of a chapel, whether the covenants 
may be amended to permit a chapel, and whether the covenants are ambiguous as to 
either of those questions. If an ambiguity does exist, this Court may resolve the question 
as a matter of law on the undisputed record before it, remanding for further factual 
development only if the existing evidence is considered inadequate to reach a conclusion. 
The language of the Declaration of Building and Use Restrictions ("Declaration") 
for Montana Ranchos Subdivision ("MRS") No. 2 does not expressly prohibit a chapel; in 
fact, the residential covenant may be interpreted to permit a chapel. If the language is 
considered ambiguous, the Affidavit of Arlen Fox, the developer and grantor who imposed 
the restrictions, plainly resolves the ambiguity to permit a chapel. Furthermore, the 
language of the Declaration does not expressly prohibit amendment of its terms; in fact, 
the language authorizes changes by a "majority" of lot owners. If the amendment 
provision is considered ambiguous, evidence of majority amendment of the identical 
covenants for the related MRS No. 3, in which Janyce Fox, the co-grantor, participated, 
and in which some of the plaintiffs acquiesced, resolves the ambiguity to permit the chapel 
by amendment., 
POINT I: PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
DECLARATION UNAMBIGUOUSLY PROHIBITS A CHAPEL AND 
THAT THE AFFIDAVIT OF ARLEN FOX MAY NOT BE INVOKED TO 
PERMIT A CHAPEL. 
A. Interpretation Of The Residential Covenant. 
Plaintiffs appear to accept by acquiescence the Church's interpretation that a 
chapel is consistent with the "residential purpose" covenant of Part B.l. of the Declaration, 
but they argue that a chapel structure would violate the "building type" restriction, which 
limits structures to a single-family dwelling and garage. (Brief of Appellees, hereafter "Br. 
of Aplees.," at 7.) However, the record contains no evidence of the form of the proposed 
chapel, or that the form was disapproved by the Architectural Control Committee. (See 
Part B.l., Addendum to Br. of Aplnt, hereafter "Add.," at 3.) If it is the form of the 
building, rather than its use, to which plaintiffs object, such an objection is purely 
hypothetical without record evidence. A chapel may be designed and landscaped to blend 
in with its residential setting, and there is no evidence that was not done here. 
Plaintiffs cite no authority for their assertion that a chapel would necessarily 
violate the "building type" restriction; rather, they simply offer an abstract review of the 
cases cited by the Church in support of a chapel, without challenging the principles for 
which those cases are cited. (Br. of Aplees. at 7-13.) The cited cases establish two 
conclusions: One, that residential covenants are generally construed to prohibit only 
business, commercial, or other uses incompatible with a residential purpose (Br. of Aplnt. 
at 8); and two, that a chapel has been considered consistent with residential uses and 
covenants (id. at 9-10). Plaintiffs' attempted distinctions in the cited cases do not alter 
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those conclusions. The cases stand precisely for what they were cited, not for what 
plaintiffs claim they were cited.1 
Plaintiffs' emphasis on the "building type" language of Part B.l. also leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that the residential covenant is ambiguous. The language of Part 
B.l. does not "expressly" prohibit a chapel, as plaintiffs assert (Br. of Aplees. at 12). 
Neither the word "chapel" nor any similar reference is included. Moreover the restriction 
of buildings to a single-family dwelling cannot be strictly interpreted because Part B.8. 
permits barns, outbuildings, and other structures, as long as they are not used as a 
residence. Part B.IO., authorizing the keeping of livestock, also implies that non-dwelling 
buildings will be tolerated as consistent with the intent of the residential covenant. It 
would appear that a chapel fits within the intent of the "single-family dwelling" provision 
as well as a barn or other structure. These inconsistent provisions at least create an 
ambiguity that requires resort to extrinsic evidence. See Bumgarner & Bowman Building, 
Inc. v. Hollar, 111 S.E.2d 60, 61-62 (N.C. App. 1969). The ambiguity of Part B.l. is 
amplified in this particular case, given the 5-acre size of Lot 34 relative to the other lots, 
which are all one-half acre in size. (See Br. of Aplnt. at 12-13.) 
1
 For example, Emma v. Silvestri, 227 A2d 480 (R.L 1967), does illustrate that while a dental office 
is incompatible with a residential covenant, a chapel need not be. (Br. of Aplnt. at 8, 10). In St. 
Luke's Episcopal Church v. Berry, 163 S.E.2d 664 (N.C. App. 1968), the absence of a restriction in the 
church's deed, emphasized by plaintiffs here, demonstrates that developers generally do not consider 
chapels inconsistent with residential covenants. Similarly, there is no record of a restriction in the 
Church's deed in the present case. Finally, contrary to plaintiffs' reading of Flinkingshelt v. Johnson, 187 
S.E.2d 233, 237 (S.C. 1972) (Br. of Aplees. at 11), that case does observe that n[t]he existence of schools 
and churches within a large residential area . . . is no indication of a breakdown or deviation from the 
general residential scheme or purpose of the [residential] restrictions. 
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In summary, the judgment may not be affirmed on the basis of either the 
"residential purpose" or "building type" provision of Part B.l. The cases cited by the 
Church demonstrate that such provisions do not prohibit a chapel as a matter of law, but 
may permit a chapel as consistent with the intent of the framers. At the very least, such 
language should be considered ambiguous as applied to construction of a chapel on the 
only 5-acre lot in the subdivision. 
B. Admission Of The Affidavit Of Arlen Fox. 
Plaintiffs argue that the Affidavit of Arlen Fox was inadmissible hearsay in the 
district court, because Mr. Fox is now deceased, and that his affidavit therefore may not 
be relied upon as evidence of his intent to permit a chapel in MRS No. 2. However, the 
record in this case contains no direct evidence of Mr. Fox's death. Moreover, because the 
district court admitted the evidence below, over plaintiffs' objections, and plaintiffs failed 
to file a cross-appeal challenging admission of the evidence, they may not now raise the 
issue on appeal. See, e.g., Henretty v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d 506, 511 n.ll (Utah 
1990) (appellate court lacks jurisdiction to address claim of appellees not preserved by 
cross-appeal); L. Grauman Soda Fountain Co. v. Etter, 16 P.2d 417, 419 (Ariz. 1932) 
(appellee failed to challenge admission of evidence by cross-appeal). 
Even if this Court chooses to address plaintiffs' hearsay claim, it is evident that 
the Fox Affidavit was properly admitted under the residual hearsay exception of Rule 
804(b)(5), Utah R. Evid., which states in relevant part: 
(b) The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
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(5) A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more 
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable 
efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests 
of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence. . . . 
The Fox Affidavit satisfies the conditions of Rule 804(b)(5) for admission. First, 
the affidavit has sufficient "guarantees of trustworthiness" because it was given under oath, 
under circumstances to allow free expression of the truth, and without any motive for 
untruthfulness. See Justak Bros, and Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 664 F.2d 1074, 
1081 (7th Cir. 1981) (admitting pretrial affidavit under Rule 804); Copperweld Steel Co. 
v. Demag-Mannesmann-Bohler, 578 F.2d 953, 964 (3rd Cir. 1978) (admitting attorney's 
memorandum of witness interview). Second, the affidavit pertains to the material fact of 
Mr. Fox's intent, as framer of the Declaration, with regard to interpretation of the 
residential covenant. Plainly, Mr. Fox was the person best suited to express his own 
intent as developer. See Copperweld Steel, supra, at 964. Third, for the reason just stated, 
the affidavit is more probative on the point of Mr. Fox's intent than any other available 
evidence; in fact, no other evidence on that point is available. Id. See also State v. 
Horton, 1993 WL 57791, Slip Op. at 4 (Utah App., Mar. 3, 1993) (affirming exclusion of 
affidavit because five other witnesses had testified on same matter). Plaintiffs presented 
no contrary evidence. The Affidavits of Jack Lochhead and Don Adams do not dispute 
that Mr. Fox never intended the residential covenant to prohibit a chapel. Finally, 
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admission of the affidavit serves the interests of justice because it is the best evidence 
available of the framer's intent with regard to interpretation of the residential covenant. 
Plaintiffs could have deposed and cross-examined Mr. Fox, but did not do so. 
In summary, this Court should reject plaintiffs' challenge to the Fox Affidavit 
because they failed to preserve the issue by cross-appeal, and the affidavit was properly 
admitted under Rule 804. 
POINT H: PI^JNTEFFS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
DECLARATION UNAMBIGUOUSLY PROHIBITS THE MAJORITY 
AMENDMENT TO PERMIT THE CHAPEL. 
A. Interpretation Of The Amendment Provision. 
The Church has demonstrated that the "unless" clause of Part D.l. of the 
Declaration permits majority amendment of the covenants during the initial 40 years, as 
well as during the extension periods, and alternatively, that the provision is ambiguous as 
to amendability. (Br. of Aplnt. at 14-18.) Plaintiffs maintain that Part D.l. "clearly" 
prohibits any amendment during the first 40 years, arguing that if the covenants could be 
amended at any time, the reference to an initial 40-year period would be "meaningless." 
(Br. of Aplees. at 22, 26.) However, that reasoning is not valid. Under the interpretation 
permitting amendment during the initial period, the 40-year provision would still serve the 
purpose of setting the duration of the covenants in the absence of amendment. The few 
foreign cases cited by plaintiffs overlook that fact, and the Utah cases cited do not decide 
the issue. 
The two different plausible interpretations of the amendment language lead to the 
legal conclusion that the provision is ambiguous and may not be interpreted as a matter 
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of law. Whereas most restrictive covenants contain separate provisions governing duration 
and amendability, Part D.l. is made ambiguous by the combination of both subjects in a 
single provision. {See cases in Br. of Aplnt. at 17, cited for illustrative purposes, not for 
the points claimed in Br. of Aplees. at 25.) The court in Valdes v. Moore, 476 S.W.2d 
936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), construing language similar to Part D.l., acknowledged the 
ambiguity: 
A reading of the above quoted duration provision from the 
original restrictions clearly presents a question of construction. The 
proviso therein does not specifically limit the time as to which the 
restrictions may be amended. The language does not specifically 
say that the restrictions may be amended by the majority within the 
first 25 years, nor does it say that they may not be amended within 
such period. A literal reading of the language used would indicate 
that the owners of a majority of the lots could amend the 
restrictions before the first 25 year period had ended. [Id. at 939.] 
The court concluded that, while such language "cannot be construed as a matter of law," 
id., the summary judgment permitting majority amendment during the initial period should 
be upheld on the basis of "judicial admission" by the party challenging the amendment, id. 
at 940-41. 
In summary, Part D.l. does not clearly prohibit majority amendment during the 
initial 40-year period. Accordingly, the Court should "resolve all doubts in favor of the 
free and unrestricted use of property." Parish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419, 336 P.2d 122, 
123 (1959). See also Matthews v. Kernewood, Inc., 40 A.2d 522, 526 (Md. 1945) (strictly 
construing amendment provision in favor of the free use of the property). The Church's 
unchallenged extrinsic evidence of intent to permit majority amendment justifies entry of 
judgment enforcing the amendment. 
7 
B. The Amendment Need Not Be Unanimous. 
Plaintiffs argue that, regardless of the language of Part D.l. of the Declaration, 
the amendment deleting Lot 34 from the covenants required the unanimous approval of 
the lot owners because the amendment does not have a uniform effect. (Br. of Aplees. 
at 27-30.) However, the uniformity of effect involves factual questions that cannot be 
decided as a matter of law. A factfinder could conclude that the amendment is uniform 
in that all remaining lots continue to be governed by the Declaration and will be affected 
equally by the amendment permitting the chapel and park on Lot 34. Plaintiffs' argument 
would produce the anomalous result of requiring that the amendment permit a chapel and 
park on every half-acre lot in the subdivision. Given the vastly disproportionate size of 
Lot 34, perfect uniformity in the application of covenants and amendments, as between 
Lot 34 and the smaller remaining lots, is not possible. For example, Part B.10., permitting 
up to six head of horses and cattle on each lot, has had practical application only to Lot 
34. The framer of the Declaration and the lot owners must reasonably have anticipated 
and expected some disproportionate impact in the application of covenants as between 
Lot 34 and the remaining lots. 
Plaintiffs rely on Montoya v. Barreras, 473 P.2d 363 (N.M. 1970), and La 
Esperanza Townhome Ass'n v. Title Security Agency, 689 P.2d 178 (Ariz. App. 1984). Those 
cases invalidated majority amendments to delete certain lots from the restrictive covenants 
on the basis that the amendments did not have a uniform effect, despite express covenant 
language permitting majority amendment. Such an extreme rule has never been, and 
should not be, adopted in Utah, where permissibility of an amendment is governed by the 
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covenant language, not by the perceived effect of the amendment. See generally Cecala 
v. Thorley, 164 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah App. 1988). The New Mexico Supreme Court has 
since retreated from Montoya, permitting nonunanimous amendments under a factual 
"reasonableness" test. Appel v. Presley Companies, 806 P.2d 1054, 1056 (N.M. 1991). The 
cases cited by plaintiffs simply go far beyond Utah law. 
Plaintiffs also cite Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981), in support of 
requiring a unanimous amendment, while conceding that the case did not address the 
precise issue here. (Br. of Aplees. at 29.) Crimmins rejected a purported majority 
amendment of a restrictive covenant against home businesses. However, Crimmins is 
distinguishable from Montoya and La Esperanza because the amendment in Crimmins did 
have the uniform effect of allowing a business in any of the residences. Id. at 480. 
Therefore, the court did not require unanimity because of nonuniform effect. Neither 
can Crimmins be read to require unanimity in all amendments of restrictive covenants; no 
other case in the country has gone that far, and the cases cited by Crimmins permit 
nonunanimous amendments consistent with the terms of the covenants. See Rogers v. 
Zwolak, 110 A. 674, 676 (Del. Ch. 1920). Hie only possible basis for the ruling in 
Crimmins is that the court interpreted the amendment provision in that case to prohibit 
nonunanimous amendment during the initial 25-year period of the covenants. See 636 
P.2d at 479. However, because the amendment language there is not quoted by the court, 
no comparison can be made with Part D.l. in the present case. Accordingly, Crimmins 
is not helpful in resolving the issue here, whether Part D.l. requires the amendment 
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permitting a chapel and park on Lot 34 to be unanimous. Because the language of Part 
D.l. makes no mention of unanimity, but refers only to "majority" amendment, the 
amendment here should be upheld. 
Cases from other jurisdictions support that conclusion. If the covenant language 
permits amendment or even termination by majority vote, property owners must be 
deemed to have constructive notice of such provisions, and those provisions must be 
enforced as written, even if it results in prejudice to some owners. See, e.g., Warren v. 
Del Pizzo, 611 P.2d 309 (Or. App. 1980) (majority amendment of building height 
restrictions); Brown v. McDavid, 676 P.2d 714 (Colo. App. 1983) (termination by 66 
percent of owners). As stated in Warren: 
While it is recognized that the challenged amendment to the 
"Declaration of Restriction" operates to the prejudice of plaintiffs 
and others similarly situated, the record shows that the proviso 
authorizing this amendment was a part of the "Declaration" at the 
time plaintiffs purchased their lots. Plaintiffs must therefore be 
deemed to have had constructive notice of this provision and the 
possibility at least that the building restrictions could conceivably be 
changed in this fashion. [611 P.2d at 311.] 
The same principles apply to a majority amendment, such as the one under 
review, removing one lot, or a certain area, from the covenants. For example, in Bryant 
v. Lake Highlands Development Co., 618 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), the required 
90 percent of lot owners amended the declaration to remove certain lots from the 
covenant restrictions. The plaintiffs challenged the amendment on the basis alleged here, 
that "the alterations did not apply to all of the properties subject to the original 
restrictions." Id. at 923. The court rejected that argument: 
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The terms of the Declaration clearly allow for amendment 
if the requisite number of votes is achieved. There are no limitations 
expressed as to the types of amendments allowed. All of the 
developed lots remain subject to the original restrictions and are 
therefore affected alike. It appears that the effect of the 
amendment would be to merely reduce the size of the area subject 
to the original restrictions. . . . 
Having purchased their lots subject to the Declarations which 
included a right of amendment the plaintiffs had no guaranty that 
the addition would remain exclusively comprised of townhouses. 
[Id., emp. added.] 
See also Valdes v. Moore, supra, 476 S.W.2d at 939-41 (upholding majority amendment 
during initial 25-year period removing portion of land from restrictions); Steve Vogli & 
Co. v. Lane, 405 S.W.2d 885, 888-89 (Mo. 1966) (upholding majority deletion of certain 
lots from restrictions-such amendment "need not be uniform as to all lots"); Morgan v. 
Sigal, 157 A. 412, 413 (Conn. 1931) (restrictions are terminable as to any lot with consent 
of majority). 
In summary, the amendment at issue here, removing Lot 34 from the restrictions 
of the Declaration, need not be unanimous. The amendment may be considered uniform 
in effect, and even if not, the extreme cases cited by plaintiffs do not apply. The 
language of Part D.l. does not require unanimity, but permits amendment by a majority 
of owners. Moreover, as in Bryant, supra, the language does not limit the types of 
amendments allowed. Accordingly, the amendment to permit a chapel and park on Lot 
34 is valid. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Order of the district court 
and either order that the Church's motion for summary judgment be granted, or that the 
case be remanded for trial. 
Dated this /fV^day of March, 1993. 
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